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1. Introduction 
 
May’s celebrated theorem (1952) shows that, if a group of individuals wants to make 
a choice between two alternatives (say x and y), then majority voting is the unique 
decision procedure satisfying a set of attractive minimal conditions. The conditions 
are (i) universal domain: the decision procedure should produce an outcome (x, y or 
tie) for any logically possible combination of individual votes for x and y; (ii) 
anonymity: the collective choice should be invariant under permutations of the 
individual votes, i.e. all individual votes should have equal weight; (iii) neutrality: if 
the individual votes for x and y are swapped, then the outcome should be swapped in 
the same way, i.e. the labels of the alternatives should not matter; (iv) positive 
responsiveness: supposing all other votes remain the same, if one individual changes 
his or her vote in favour of a winning alternative, then this alternative should remain 
the outcome; if there was previously a tie, a change of one individual vote should 
break the tie in the direction of that change. 
 
May’s theorem is often interpreted as a vindication of majoritarian democracy when a 
collective decision between two alternatives is to be made. Many collective decision 
problems are, however, more complex. They may not be confined to a binary choice 
between two alternatives, or between the acceptance or rejection of a single 
proposition.  
 
Suppose there are three or more alternatives (say x, y and z). In that case, it may seem 
natural to determine an overall collective preference ranking of these alternatives by 
applying majority voting to each pair of alternatives. But, unfortunately, pairwise 
majority voting may lead to cyclical collective preferences. Suppose person 1 prefers 
x to y to z, person 2 prefers y to z to x, and person 3 prefers z to x to y. Then there are 
majorities of two out of three for x against y, for y against z, and for z against x, a 
cycle. This is Condorcet's paradox.  
 
But a greater number of alternatives is not the only way in which a collective decision 
problem may deviate from the single binary choice framework of May's theorem. A 
collective decision problem may also involve simultaneous decisions on the 
acceptance or rejection of multiple interconnected propositions. For instance, a policy 
package or a legal decision may consist of multiple propositions which mutually 
constrain each other. To ensure consistency, the acceptance or rejection of some of 
these propositions may constrain the acceptance or rejection of others. Once again, a 
natural suggestion would be to apply majority voting to each proposition separately. 
As we will see in detail below, however, this method also generates a paradox, 
sometimes called the 'doctrinal paradox' or 'discursive dilemma': propositionwise 
majority voting over multiple interconnected propositions may lead to inconsistent 
collective sets of judgments on these propositions. 
 
We have thus identified two dimensions along which a collective decision problem 
may deviate from the single binary choice framework of May’s theorem: (a) the 
number of alternatives, and (b) the number of interconnected propositions on which 
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simultaneous decisions are to be made. Deviations along each of these dimensions 
lead to a breakdown of the attractive properties of majority voting highlighted by 
May's theorem. Deviations along dimension (a) can generate Condorcet's paradox: 
pairwise majority voting over multiple alternatives may lead to cyclical collective 
preferences. And deviations along dimension (b) can generate the 'doctrinal paradox' 
or 'discursive dilemma': propositionwise majority voting over multiple interconnected 
propositions may lead to inconsistent collective sets of judgments on these 
propositions. 
 
In each case, we can ask whether the paradox is just an artefact of majority voting in 
special contrived circumstances, or whether it actually illustrates a more general 
problem. Arrow's impossibility theorem (1951/1963) famously affirms the latter for 
dimension (a): Condorcet's paradox brings to the surface a more general impossibility 
problem of collective decision making between three or more alternatives. But 
Arrow's theorem does not apply straightforwardly to the case of dimension (b). List 
and Pettit (2001) have shown that the 'doctrinal paradox' or 'discursive dilemma' also 
illustrates a more general impossibility problem, this time regarding simultaneous 
collective decisions on multiple interconnected propositions. The two impossibility 
theorems are related, but not identical. Arrow's result makes it less surprising to find 
that an impossibility problem pertains to the latter decision problem too, and yet the 
two theorems are not trivial corollaries of each other. 
 
The aim of this paper is to compare these two impossibility results and to explore 
their connections and dissimilarities. Sections 2 and 3 briefly introduce, respectively, 
Arrow's theorem and the new theorem on the aggregation of sets of judgments. 
Section 4 addresses the question of whether the two generalizations of May's single 
binary choice framework -- the framework of preferences over three or more options 
and the framework of sets of judgments over multiple connected propositions -- can 
somehow be mapped into each other. Reinterpreting preferences as ranking 
judgments, section 5 derives a simple impossibility theorem on the aggregation of 
preferences from the theorem on the aggregation of sets of judgments, and compares 
the result with Arrow's theorem. A formal proof of the result is given in an appendix. 
Section 6 discusses escape-routes from the two impossibility results, and indicates 
their parallels. Section 7, finally, explores the role of two crucial conditions 
underlying the two impossibility theorems -- independence of irrelevant alternatives 
and systematicity --, and identifies a unifying mechanism generating both 
impossibility problems. 
 
2. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem  
 
May's theorem concerns a single collective decision between two alternatives. 
Arrow's theorem concerns a single collective decision between more than two 
alternatives. Such decision problems arise, for instance, in elections with three or 
more candidates, or when the task is to rank several restaurants, several candidates or 
several policy alternatives in an order of collective preference. 
 
Suppose there is a set of individuals, N, each named by a numeral: 1, 2, 3, ..., n; we 
assume that N has at least two members. Suppose further there is a set of alternatives, 
X, each named by a letter x, y, z, ...; we assume that X has at least three members. This 
is the crucial deviation from the binary choice framework of May's theorem. 
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Each individual, i, has a personal preference ordering of the alternatives in X, labelled 
Ri, where xRiy is interpreted to mean "from person i's perspective, x is at least as good 
as y". The ordering Ri is assumed to satisfy three rationality properties: reflexivity, 
transitivity and connectedness. Ri is reflexive: for any alternative x in X, we have xRix 
("an alternative is always at least as good as itself"). Ri is transitive: for any 
alternatives x, y and z in X, if xRiy and yRiz, then we must also have xRiz ("if x is at 
least as good as y, and y is at least as good as z, then x is at least as good as z"). Ri is 
connected: for any alternatives x and y in X, we must have either xRiy or yRix ("two 
alternatives are always comparable: either x is at least as good as y, or y is at least as 
good as x"). The ordering Ri also induces a strong ordering, Pi. This is defined as 
follows: for all x and y in X, xPiy if and only if xRiy and not yRix, where xPiy is 
interpreted to mean "from person i's perspective, x is strictly better than y". 
 
We can now define the profile of personal preference orderings that are held across 
the group, N, as the n-tuple of those personal preference orderings, containing one for 
each person: {R1, R2, ..., Rn} or in short {Ri}n∈N. 
 
Now the question is whether there is any aggregation procedure which takes as its 
input a profile of reflexive, transitive and connected personal preference orderings 
across the individuals in N, and which produces as its output a collective preference 
ordering, R, which is also reflexive, transitive and connected. Such a procedure is 
called a social welfare function and labelled F. xRy is interpreted to mean "from the 
perspective of the group N, x is at least as good as y". In analogy with the personal 
preference orderings, R also induces a strong ordering P. 
 
The problem Arrow's theorem addresses is whether there is a social welfare function, 
F, that satisfies some minimal conditions. Let {Ri}n∈N be a profile of personal 
preference orderings, and let R be the corresponding collective preference ordering 
produced by the social welfare function F, i.e. R = F({Ri}n∈N). The conditions are: 
 
UNIVERSAL DOMAIN (U). The domain of F, i.e. the set of admissible inputs to F, is 
the set of all logically possible profiles of reflexive, transitive and connected personal 
preference orderings. 
 
Condition (U) is the requirement that any logically possible combination of personal 
preference orderings across individuals be admissible as input to the aggregation, 
provided that each individual holds a personal preference ordering which satisfies the 
conditions of reflexivity, transitivity and connectedness.  
 
WEAK PARETO PRINCIPLE (P). If, for all individuals i in N, xPiy, then xPy. 
 
Condition (P) is the requirement that, if all individuals unanimously prefer one 
alternative to another, then this alternative should also be collectively preferred to the 
other. 
 
INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES (I). Suppose {Ri}i∈N and {R*i}i∈N 
are two profiles of personal preference orderings in the domain of F and x and y are 
two alternatives in X such that, for all individuals i in N, xRiy if and only if xR*iy. 
Then xRy if and only if xR*y. 
 4 
 
Condition (I) is the requirement that the collective ranking of any pair of alternatives 
should depend exclusively on the individual rankings over that pair. 
 
NON-DICTATORSHIP (D). F is not dictatorial: there does not exist an individual i in N 
such that, for all profiles of personal preference orderings in the domain of F, if xPiy,  
then xPy. 
 
Condition (D) is the requirement that there should not be one individual, a dictator, 
whose preference (except possibly in cases of indifference) always determines the 
collective preference. 
 
Pairwise majority voting over the alternatives in X constitutes a social welfare 
function which satisfies (U), (P), (I) and (D), but which sometimes fails to generate 
transitive collective preference orderings, as Condorcet's paradox shows. Arrow's 
theorem shows that this problem is not just an artefact of pairwise majority voting. 
 
Theorem 1. (Arrow, 1951/1963) There exists no social welfare function (generating 
reflexive, transitive and connected collective preference orderings) which satisfies 
(U), (P), (I) and (D). 
 
A large literature addresses the question of what Arrow's theorem does and does not 
show (see, amongst many others, Riker, 1982; Saari, 1998; Bossert and Weymark, 
1996; List, 2001). As we here aim to compare Arrow's theorem with another 
impossibility theorem, we will now turn to the exposition of that new result. 
 
3. An Impossibility Theorem Regarding the Aggregation of Sets of Judgments 
 
Arrow's theorem addresses decision problems that differ from the ones addressed by 
May's theorem in the number of alternatives. We will now address decision problems 
that preserve the binary choice structure of May's framework, but that differ from 
May's framework in that they involve simultaneous decisions on multiple 
interconnected propositions. Such problems will be called problems of aggregating 
sets of judgments.  
 
Judgments are modelled on acts of acceptance or rejection of certain propositions, and 
differ from credences in not allowing of degrees of confidence. Under the present 
concept of judgment, a judgment is always an on or off affair; either someone accepts 
a certain proposition, or they do not. The problem of aggregating sets of judgments 
arises when a group has to come up with an overall set of judgments on a set of 
connected propositions -- on a set of propositions where the acceptance or rejection of 
certain propositions constrains the acceptance or rejection of others -- and when it has 
to do so on the basis of the judgments individuals make on these propositions. 
 
Just as Condorcet's paradox serves to introduce the aggregation problem addressed by 
Arrow's theorem, the present aggregation problem can be introduced by a paradox, 
sometimes called the 'doctrinal paradox' or 'discursive dilemma'. 
 
Suppose a three-judge court has to make a decision on whether a defendant is liable 
under a charge of breach of contract (Kornhauser and Sager, 1993, p. 11). According 
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to legal doctrine, the court is required to find that the defendant is liable (R) if and 
only if it finds, first that a valid contract was in place (P), and second that the 
defendant's behaviour was such as to breach a contract of that kind (Q), formally 
(R↔(P∧Q)).  Now suppose that the three judges, 1, 2 and 3, vote as follows on those 
issues and on the derivable matter of whether the defendant is indeed liable. The 'true' 
or 'false' on any row represents the disposition of the relevant judge to accept or reject 
the corresponding proposition. 
 
 valid contract 
P 
breach 
Q 
legal doctrine 
(R↔(P∧Q)) 
defendant liable 
R 
1 yes yes yes yes 
2 yes no yes no 
3 no yes yes no 
Table 1 
 
Note that each judge holds a perfectly consistent set of judgments in light of the 
proposition that R should be accepted if and only if both P and Q are accepted. 
 
Now if we apply majority voting to each proposition then P ("there was a valid 
contract in place") and Q ("there was a breach") will each be accepted by a majority 
of two out of three, but R ("the defendant is liable") will be rejected by a majority of 
two out of three, in spite of the unanimous acceptance of the proposition that R should 
be accepted if and only if both P and Q are accepted, a contradiction. This shows that 
propositionwise majority voting can generate an inconsistent collective set of 
judgments, even when each individual holds a perfectly consistent set of judgments.  
 
Like Condorcet's paradox, the paradox on propositionwise majority voting raises the 
question of whether the paradox is just a contrived thoretical artefact, or whether it 
brings to the surface a more general problem of aggregation. We shall now turn to the 
presentation of a more general impossibility result, first presented in List and Pettit 
(2001). 
 
Suppose, again, there is a set of individuals, N, each named by a numeral: 1, 2, 3, ..., 
n, where N has at least two members. Let Ξ be the set of propositions on which 
judgments are to be made, including atomic proposition like P and Q and compound 
propositions like (P∧Q), (P∨Q), (R↔(P∧Q)), and so on; we assume that Ξ contains at 
least two distinct atomic propositions, P, Q, their conjunction, (P∧Q), and the 
negation of their conjunction, ¬(P∧Q). 
 
We identify the set of judgments made by an individual, i, over the propositions in Ξ -
- we call them i's personal set of judgments -- with the set of those propositions in Ξ 
which person i accepts. The individual's personal set of judgments is thus a subset Φi 
of Ξ. Note that non-acceptance of a proposition (the non-inclusion of that proposition 
in Φi) does not involve making a judgment in respect of it; in the case of non-
acceptance of a proposition, person i will make a judgment only if he or she accepts 
the negation of the proposition (i.e. if the negation of the proposition is included in 
Φi).  
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The personal set of judgments Φi is assumed to satisfy three rationality properties: 
completeness, consistency and deductive closure. Φi is complete: for all propositions φ 
in Ξ, either φ or its negation ¬φ (or unnegated form ψ in case φ = ¬ψ ) is contained in 
Φi ("an individual always accepts a proposition or its negation"). Φi is consistent: 
there is no proposition φ in Ξ such that both φ and its negation ¬φ are contained in Φi 
("an individual never accepts a proposition and its negation simultaneously"). Φi is 
deductively closed: whenever Φi logically entails some other proposition ψ in Ξ, ψ is 
also contained in Φi ("an individual always accepts the logical consequences of what 
he or she accepts"). 
 
In analogy to a profile of personal preference orderings, we define the profile of 
personal sets of judgments that are held across the group, N, as the n-tuple of those 
personal sets of judgments, containing one for each person: {Φ1, Φ2, ..., Φn} or in 
short {Φi}n∈N. 
 
This time the question is whether there is any aggregation procedure which takes as 
its input a profile of complete, consistent and deductively closed personal sets of 
judgements across the individuals in N, and which produces as its output a collective 
set of judgments, Φ, which is also complete, consistent and deductively closed. Such 
a procedure is a called a judgment aggregation function and labelled F. Φ is also a 
subset of Ξ, and is interpreted as the set of those propositions in Ξ which are 
collectively accepted. 
 
Specifically, the question is whether there is a judgment aggregation function, F, that 
satisfies some minimal conditions. Let {Φi}n∈N be a profile of personal sets of 
judgments, and let Φ be the corresponding collective set of judgments produced by 
the judgment aggregation function F, i.e. Φ = F({Φi}n∈N). The conditions are: 
 
UNIVERSAL DOMAIN (U). The domain of F, i.e. the set of admissible inputs to F, is 
the set of all logically possible profiles of complete, consistent and deductively closed 
personal sets of judgments. 
 
Condition (U) is the requirement that any logically possible combination of personal 
sets of judgments across individuals be admissible as input to the aggregation, 
provided that each individual holds a personal set of judgments which satisfies the 
conditions of completeness, consistency and deductive closure.  
 
ANONYMITY (A). For any {Φi}i∈N in the domain of F and any permutation σ : N → N, 
F({Φi}i∈N) = F({Φσ(i)}i∈N). 
 
Condition (A) is the requirement that the collective set of judgments be invariant 
under any permutation of the individuals in N, or, informally, that all individuals be 
given equal weight in the aggregation. 
 
SYSTEMATICITY (S). There exists a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that, for any 
{Φi}i∈N in the domain of F, F({Φi}i∈N) = {φ∈Ξ : f(δ1(φ), δ2(φ), ..., δn(φ)) = 1}, where, 
for each i in N and each φ in Ξ, δi(φ) = 1 if φ∈Φi and δi(φ) = 0 if φ∉Φi. 
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Condition (S) is the requirement that (i) the collective judgment on each proposition 
should depend exclusively on the pattern of individual judgments on that proposition 
and (ii) the same pattern of dependence should hold for all propositions. 
 
Propositionwise majority voting over the propositions in Ξ constitutes a judgment 
aggregation function which satisfies (U), (A) and (S), but which sometimes fails to 
generate complete, consistent and deductively closed collective sets of judgments, as 
the 'doctrinal paradox' or 'discursive dilemma' shows. List and Pettit have shown that 
this problem is not just an artefact of propositionwise majority voting. 
 
Theorem 2. (List and Pettit, 2001) There exists no judgment aggregation function F 
(generating complete, consistent and deductively closed collective sets of judgments) 
which satisfies (U), (A) and (S).  
 
Every procedure, not just propositionwise majority voting, will fail to satisfy all the 
conditions of theorem 2 simultaneously.  
 
4. Can the Framework of Preferences and the Framework of Sets of Judgments 
be Mapped into Each Other? 
 
To address the question of how Arrow's theorem and the theorem on the aggregation 
of sets of judgments are related to each other, it is useful to ask whether the two 
frameworks -- the framework of preference orderings and the framework of sets of 
judgments -- can be mapped into each other. We shall first address the question of 
whether the framework of sets of judgments can be interpreted as a special case of the 
framework of preferences, and we shall then address the question of whether the 
framework of preferences can be interpreted as a special case of the framework of sets 
of judgments. We will argue that the latter is the more promising approach towards 
connecting the two frameworks. 
 
Transcribing into the framework of preferences 
 
To ask whether the framework of sets of judgments can be interpreted as a special 
case of the framework of preferences, we need to specify the set of alternatives, X, 
over which the relevant preferences are to be held. The most obvious possibility is the 
following.2 Each logically possible set of judgments over the propositions in Ξ is 
interpreted as a single alternative. Then the set of alternatives, X, is the set of all 
logically possible sets of judgments over the relevant propositions. The alternatives 
(or 'candidates') are thus not individual propositions or their negations, but rather 
entire sets of judgments, each in one 'package'. Under this approach, each individual's 
most preferred alternative is precisely the set of judgments accepted by that 
individual. But, apart from this top preference, we have no further information about 
an individual's preferences. For instance, given two sets of judgments both of which 
are different from the individual's most preferred set of judgments, we have no 
information about how the individual would rank these two sets. Of course, we might 
make certain assumptions about when an individual would prefer one set of 
judgments to another, using, for instance, the symmetrical distance of a set of 
judgments from the individual's most preferred set of judgments as a measure of 
(dis)preference for that set.3 But such assumptions would be stipulations beyond the 
information contained in the framework of sets of judgments. Hence, if the task is to 
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genuinely map the framework of sets of judgments into the framework of preferences, 
each individual's set of judgments induces only an incomplete preference ordering 
over all logically possible sets of judgments. The ordering would determine a most 
highly ranked alternative, but it would be silent on the relative rankings of all other 
alternatives. 
 
This observation does not imply that a problem of determining a collective set of 
judgments can never be interpreted as an appropriate problem of preference 
aggregation. In particular, suppose we define the set X to be the set of all logically 
possible sets of judgments over the propositions in Ξ. And suppose, further, that we 
assign, to each individual, not just a single most preferred set of judgments, i.e. a 
single most preferred alternative in X, but rather a complete preference ordering over 
the set X. Then the problem of determining a collective set of judgments becomes the 
problem of aggregating the individual preference orderings over X into a collectively 
most preferred alternative. But this strategy clearly requires a richer informational 
basis than the one used by the theorem on the aggregation of sets of judgments and is 
therefore unsuitable for mapping the framework of this theorem into the framework of 
preferences.4 
 
It is worth noting, in connection with this strategy, that when transcribed into the 
framework of preferences instances of the discursive dilemma do not always 
constitute instances of the Condorcet paradox; and equally instances of the Condorcet 
paradox do not always constitute instances of the discursive dilemma (see Kornhauser 
1992b, 453-57). Consider the situation represented in Table I where a discursive 
dilemma arises and imagine that the orderings of the parties, 1, 2 and 3, over sets of 
judgments on the questions of validity and breach, respectively —  on other questions 
we may assume that the answers go accordingly — are as follows: 
 
1: Yes-No > No-Yes > Yes-Yes > No-No 
2: Yes-Yes > No-Yes > Yes-No > No-No 
3: No-Yes > Yes-Yes > Yes-No > No-No. 
 
If the orderings of the parties follow this pattern, then the No-Yes pair — and therefore the 
conclusion in favour of No — is a Condorcet winner. It is preferred by a majority to each 
of the other three pairs: it is preferred by 1 and 3 to Yes-Yes;  it is preferred by 2 and 3 to 
Yes-No; and it is preferred by all to No-No. Thus in such a scenario, there would be a 
discursive dilemma but no Condorcet paradox. 
It is equally easy to illustrate the second possibility, in which we have a Condorcet 
paradox but no discursive dilemma. We will have a Condorcet paradox if the orderings of 
the parties in a certain scenario have this structure:  
 
1: No-No > Yes-No > No-Yes > Yes-Yes 
2: No-Yes > No-No > Yes-No > Yes-Yes 
3: Yes-No > No-Yes > No-No > Yes-Yes. 
 
Given these orderings, a majority (1 and 2) will prefer No-No to Yes-No; a majority (1 
and 3) will prefer Yes-No to No-Yes; and yet, paradoxically, a majority (2 and 3) will 
prefer No-Yes to No-No. But despite the presence of a Condorcet paradox in such a 
scenario, there will be no discursive dilemma. The parties will vote on the premises 
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according to their most preferred pairs: that is, No-No; No-Yes; and Yes-No. And that will 
not give rise to the dilemma.  
Transcribing into the framework of judgments 
We will now address the converse question of whether the framework of preferences 
can be interpreted as a special case of the framework of judgments. A preference 
ordering is a binary relation, which in turn can be represented as a set of propositions 
of first-order predicate calculus. For instance, the reflexive, complete and transitive 
ordering Ri on the set of alternatives {x, y, z} which ranks the alternatives in the order 
x > y > z, can be represented as the set of propositions Ρi := {xRy, yRz, xRz, xRx, yRy, 
zRz} or, to make it complete, consistent and deductively closed and to include the 
rationality conditions of orderings as well, Ρ*i := {xRy, yRz, xRz, xRx, yRy, zRz, ¬yRx, 
¬zRy, ¬zRx, ∀w(wRw) ("reflexivity"), ∀u∀v∀w((uRv ∨ vRw) → uRw) 
("transitivity"), ∀v∀w(vRw ∨ wRv) ("connectedness")} (or, if necessary, the deductive 
closure of the latter set). In this fashion, every ordering Ri can be represented as a set 
of propositions from the predicate calculus Ρ*i. Ρ*i  can be interpreted as a set of 
ranking judgments.  
 
The Condorcet paradox can now be rendered as follows: 
 
 xRy yRz xRz yRx zRy zRx ∀w(wRw) 
 
 
"reflexivity" 
∀u∀v∀w 
((uRv ∨ vRw) 
→ uRw) 
"transitivity" 
∀v∀w 
(vRw ∨ wRv) 
 
"connectedness"
1 
(x>y>z) 
yes yes yes no no no yes yes yes 
2 
(y>z>x) 
no yes no yes no yes yes yes yes 
3 
(z>x>y) 
yes no no no yes yes yes yes yes 
majority yes yes no no no yes yes yes yes 
Table 2 
 
Each individual holds a perfectly consistent set of ranking judgments in light of the 
propositions of reflexivity, transitivity and connectedness. 
 
If we apply majority voting to each proposition, then xRy, yRz and zRx will each be 
accepted by a majority of two out of three, but xRz will be rejected by a majority of 
two out of three, in spite of the unanimous acceptance of the proposition that the 
conjunction of xRy and yRz implies xRz (transitivity), a contradiction. Propositionwise 
majority voting generates an inconsistent collective set of ranking judgments, 
although each individual holds a perfectly consistent set of ranking judgments.  
 
Condorcet's paradox can thus be interpreted as a specific version of the 'doctrinal 
paradox' or 'discursive dilemma', applied to ranking judgments. Under this 
interpretation, the aggregation problem is indeed one of aggregating judgments over 
multiple interconnected propositions. The propositions are ranking propositions 
expressed in first-order predicate calculus, and their logical interconnections are 
specified by the conditions of reflexivity, transitivity and connectedness, also 
expressed as propositions of first-order predicate calculus. Likewise, Arrow's theorem 
can be interpreted as a result about the aggregation of sets of ranking judgments, 
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interconnected by the conditions of reflexivity, transitivity and connectedness, all 
expressed in first-order predicate calculus. 
 
Does this make Arrow's theorem a logical consequence of the theorem on the 
aggregation of sets of judgments? Not quite. As we have seen, the expression of 
ranking judgments requires the use of first-order predicate calculus. The theorem on 
the aggregation of sets of judgments, on the other hand, concerns propositions of the 
propositional calculus. The latter cannot fully represent the rich internal structure of 
ranking propositions and of the connection rules of reflexivity, transivity and 
connectedness, all of which contain quantifiers.5 
 
But in the next section we will see that the mathematical mechanism underlying the 
proof of the propositional-calculus version of the theorem on the aggregation of sets 
of judgments can be generalized so as to apply to sets of propositions of first-order 
predicate calculus, and can thus be used to prove a simple impossibility theorem on 
the aggregation of ranking judgments. The new theorem is closely related to, but not 
identical with, Arrow's theorem, and serves as an illustration of the exact logical 
relation between the two theorems we here aim to compare. 
 
5. A Simple Impossibility Theorem on the Aggregation of Ranking Judgments 
 
The basic framework is similar to, but not identical with, the framework of Arrow's 
theorem. As before, let N be the set of individuals, where N has at least two members. 
Let X be the set of alternatives, including at least three alternatives, say x, y, z. Here 
we assume that each individual, i, has a strong personal preference ordering, Pi, over 
the set of alternatives, where Pi satisfies irreflexivity, transitivity and completeness. Pi 
is irreflexive: there exists no alternative x in X such that xPix ("an alternative is never 
better than itself"). Pi is transitive: for any alternatives x, y and z in X, if xPiy and yPiz, 
then we must also have xPiz ("if x is better than y, and y is better than z, then x is 
better than z"). Pi is complete: for any two distinct alternatives x and y in X, we must 
have either xPiy or yPix ("two distinct alternatives are always comparable: either x is 
better than y, or y is better than x"). The requirement that each individual should have 
a strong personal preference ordering is more demanding than the corresponding 
assumption of Arrow's theorem.  
 
The following interpretation illustrates how the strong personal preference orderings 
can be interpreted in terms of ranking judgments. The set of propositions on which 
judgments are to be made, Ξ, is the set of all logically possible ranking propositions 
over pairs of distinct alternatives in X, i.e. Ξ = {xPy : x, y∈X, x≠y}. For any pair of 
alternatives in X, x and y, individual i accepts the judgment xPy if that individual's 
preference ordering Pi ranks x above y, i.e. if xPiy. The negation of a proposition xPy 
in Ξ is simply yPx. 
 
The conditions of irreflexivity, transitivity and completeness can be reinterpreted in 
terms of the conditions of completeness, consistency and deductive closure, as 
defined in the context of sets of judgments. The completeness of each Pi entails the 
completeness of person i's set of judgments over Ξ: an individual always accepts 
either a proposition or its negation, i.e. at least one of xPy or yPx for each such 
proposition-negation pair. The irreflexivity and transitivity of each Pi entails the 
consistency of person i's set of judgments over Ξ: an individual never accepts both a 
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proposition and its negation, i.e. never both xPy and yPx. The transivity of each Pi, 
finally, entails the deductive closure of person i's set of judgments over Ξ: interpreting 
xPz as a logical consequence of xPy and yPz, an individual always accepts the logical 
consequences of other propositions he or she accepts. 
 
A few more definitions are due. The profile of strong personal preference orderings 
that are held across the group, N, is the n-tuple of those strong personal preference 
orderings, containing one for each person: {P1, P2, ..., Pn} or in short {Pi}n∈N. Further, 
define a ranking judgment aggregation function to be a function, F, which takes as its 
input a profile of irreflexive, transitive and complete strong personal preference 
orderings across the individuals in N, and which produces as its output a strong 
collective preference ordering, P, which is also irreflexive, transitive and complete. 
 
The conditions of universal domain, anonymity and systematicity, as stated for the 
theorem on the aggregation of sets of judgments, can now be restated for the context 
of ranking judgments. Let {Pi}n∈N be a profile of strong personal preference 
orderings, and let P be the corresponding collective preference ordering produced by 
the ranking judgment aggregation function F, i.e. P = F({Pi}n∈N).  
 
Condition (U) entails the requirement that any logically possible combination of 
strong personal preference orderings across individuals be admissible as input to the 
aggregation, provided that each individual holds a strong personal preference ordering 
which satisfies the conditions of irreflexivity, transitivity and completeness. Note that 
this condition is equivalent to the condition of universal domain in the framework of 
Arrow's theorem, except that the input and output to the aggregation is restricted to 
strong orderings. 
 
UNIVERSAL DOMAIN (U). The domain of F is the set of all logically possible profiles 
of irreflexive, transitive and complete strong personal preference orderings. 
 
Condition (A) entails the requirement that the strong collective preference ordering be 
invariant under any permutation of the individuals in N, or, informally, that all 
individuals be given equal weight in the aggregation. Note that this condition is more 
demanding than the condition of non-dictatorship in the framework of Arrow's 
theorem. It entails, but is not entailed by, non-dictatorship. 
 
ANONYMITY (A). For any {Pi}i∈N in the domain of F and any permutation σ : N → N, 
F({Pi}i∈N) = F({Pσ(i)}i∈N). 
 
Condition (S) entails the requirement that (i) each collective pairwise ranking 
judgment should depend exclusively on the pattern of individual ranking judgments 
over the same pair of alternatives and (ii) the same pattern of dependence should hold 
for all pairwise ranking judgments. Part (i) of this requirement is equivalent to the 
condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives in the framework of Arrow's 
theorem. However, while independence of irrelevant alternatives still permits 
differences in the dependencies that hold for ranking judgments over different pairs of 
alternatives, part (ii) of the present requirement disallows such differences. Thus 
condition (S) entails what is called independence of non-welfare characteristics in the 
framework of Arrowian social choice. Independence of non-welfare characteristics 
entails, but is not entailed by, independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
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INDEPENDENCE OF NON-WELFARE CHARACTERISTICS (INW). Suppose {Pi}i∈N and 
{P*i}i∈N are two profiles of personal preference orderings in the domain of F and x1, 
y1 (x1≠y1) and x2, y2 (x2≠y2) are two pairs of alternatives in X such that, for all 
individuals i in N, x1Piy1 if and only if x2P*iy2. Then x1Py1 if and only if x2P*y2. 
 
The theorem on the aggregation of sets of judgments can now be restated for ranking 
judgments. The new theorem 3 is a variant of theorem 2 for the special case of the 
aggregation of ranking judgments. A formal proof of the new theorem is given in an 
appendix. 
 
Theorem 3. There exists no ranking judgment aggregation function F (generating 
irreflexive, transitive and complete strong collective preference orderings) which 
satisfies (U), (A) and (INW).  
 
Comparing theorem 1 (Arrow's theorem) and theorem 3, we make the following 
observations. First, Arrow's theorem imposes a less stringent requirement upon the 
nature of the input and the output of the aggregation: while Arrow's theorem allows 
weak orderings in both the input and the output to the aggregation, the new theorem 
requires strong orderings. Second, Arrow's theorem uses the less demanding condition 
of non-dictatorship instead of anonymity, although the conditions are of course 
similar in spirit and the condition of anonymity is arguably very compelling. Third, 
Arrow's theorem uses the less demanding condition of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives instead of independence of non-welfare characteristics. This difference 
may be less innocent. Independence of irrelevant alternatives is often already 
considered to be implausibly demanding, so that a further strengthening of the 
independence condition, such as the one in theorem 3, may seem to weaken the force 
of the resulting impossibility theorem. In section 7 below, we shall turn to the 
question of how much potentially relevant information about the individual input an 
aggregation procedure ignores when it respects each of the two independence 
conditions. Fourth, however, Arrow's theorem requires the weak Pareto principle, 
while the new theorem requires no such condition at all. In spite of the  three respects 
in which the new theorem requires more demanding conditions than Arrow's theorem 
-- namely, strong instead of weak orderings, (A) instead of (D), and (INW) instead of 
(I) --, the fourth point is striking. Theorem 3 demonstrates that an impossibility result 
on the aggregation of preferences can be derived without invoking any version of the 
Pareto principle or any other unanimity condition. In other words, not even Pareto-
inefficient aggregation procedures will satisfy the conditions of theorem 3. It should 
further be noted that, since theorem 3 holds for any number of individuals, in 
particular an odd number, the new result is not just a trivial result about the 
occurrence of ties, which strong orderings cannot handle. 
 
6. Escape-Routes from The Two Impossibility Results  
 
As is well known in the case of Arrow's theorem and as List and Pettit (2001) have 
shown in the case of the theorem on the aggregation of sets of judgments, each 
condition of each of the two theorems can be associated with a corresponding escape-
route from the impossibility problem. The main interest of the theorems — in 
particular, the main interest of our result — lies in the fact that they direct us to the 
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such escape-routes. We shall here focus only on a few escape-routes that serve to 
illustrate the connections between the two theorems. 
 
Relaxation of universal domain 
 
Suppose the input to the aggregation is relatively 'cohesive' across individuals. 
Specifically, suppose that an aggregation procedure is required to accept as admissible 
input not all logically possible profiles of personal preference orderings, or of 
personal sets of judgments, but only those profiles satisfying a certain structure 
condition: single-peakedness or value-restriction in the framework of preferences, 
unidimensional alignment in the framework of sets of judgments. Given this modified 
domain condition, pairwise majority voting will always generate reflexive, transitive 
and connected collective preference orderings, while also satisfying the weak Pareto 
principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives and non-dictatorship. And 
propositionwise majority voting will always generate complete, consistent and 
deductive closed collective sets of judgments, while also satisfying anonymity and 
systematicity.  
 
If empirical circumstances are such that the requisite level of cohesion exists, or that it 
can be brought about, the present escape-route is obviously attractive, in that it 
sacrifices none of the collective rationality of the output of the aggregation, and none 
of its responsiveness to the input. 
 
Relaxation of non-dictatorship or anonymity 
 
Suppose we allow the appointment of one individual as a dictator: the preference 
ordering, or the set of judgments, held by this individual will always be adopted as the 
collective preference ordering. We assume further that the dictator's personal 
preference ordering satisfies reflexivity, transitivity and connectedness; and that the 
dictator's personal set of judgments satisfies completeness, consistency and deductive 
closure. Then the dictatorial aggregation procedure, while violating some basic 
democratic intuitions, certainly satisfies universal domain, the weak Pareto principle 
and independence of irrelevant alternatives in the framework of preferences, and 
universal domain and systematicity in the framework of sets of judgments. 
 
As the strategy of relaxing universal domain can be associated with the idea of 
bringing about sufficient cohesion across individuals to make rational collective 
outcomes possible through democratic means, the strategy of relaxing non-
dictatorship or anonymity can be associated with the idea of giving authority to a 
chief executive in a group to ensure that, however diverse the preferences or 
judgments of the individual group members may be, the group as a whole does not 
fall into collective irrationality. 
 
Relaxation of independence of irrelevant alternatives or systematicity 
 
Suppose we do not insist that individual pairwise rankings of alternatives alone should 
determine the corresponding collective pairwise rankings; and we do not insist that 
the collective acceptance or rejection of a proposition should depend exclusively on 
the individual acceptance/rejection pattern on that proposition.  
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Then the well known method of the Borda count is a procedure for aggregating 
profiles of personal preference orderings into reflexive, transitive and connected 
collective preference orderings, which satisfies universal domain, the weak Pareto 
principle and non-dictatorship.  
 
The Borda count is an attractive procedure in those cases in which agreement on the 
set of relevant alternatives can be reached, and in which violations of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives are not associated with threats of agenda-manipulation or 
intractable third-alternative dependencies.  
 
In the framework of sets of judgments, a different type of escape-route becomes 
available: the prioritization strategy. Choose a subset of logically independent 
propositions from the set of propositions Ξ on which collective judgments are to be 
made. The subset might, for instance, contain all the 'premises', such as P and Q in the 
case of the ‘doctrinal paradox’, as shown in table 1, as well as the connection rule 
(R↔(P∧Q)). The subset is interpreted as the set of those propositions which are given 
priority or a particular weight in the collective decision process. The collective 
judgments on the propositions in this subset are then determined by the familiar 
method of propositionwise majority voting. The result, in the case of table 1, would 
be the collective acceptance of P, Q and (R↔(P∧Q)). But now the collective 
judgments on propositions outside this subset, in the present example R, are 
determined not by propositionwise majority voting, but rather by logical inference 
from the collective judgments on the prioritized propositions. In particular, since P, Q 
and (R↔(P∧Q)) are collectively accepted and they logically entail R, R will also be 
collectively accepted, in spite of the fact that R would not be accepted under 
propositionwise majority voting. This approach of prioritizing the 'premises' can be 
called the premise-centred approach. Prioritizing a different set of propositions will 
lead to a different outcome. For example, a conclusion-centred approach is also 
possible: here R as well as (R↔(P∧Q)) would be given priority. Suitably defined, the 
prioritization strategy will provide an aggregation procedure that generates complete, 
consistent and deductively closed collective sets of judgments, and that satisfies 
universal domain as well as anonymity.  
 
The prioritization strategy provides a promising escape-route from the impossibility 
result on the aggregation of sets of judgments whenever there is a prospect of 
agreement on which propositions to prioritize. 
 
Relaxation of the collective rationality conditions 
 
Suppose we relax the requirement that collective preference orderings be reflexive, 
transitive and connected; and we relax the requirement that collective sets of 
judgments be complete, consistent and deductively closed. Then we can certainly find 
aggregation procedures satisfying the other conditions of Arrow's theorem or of the 
theorem on the aggregation of sets of judgments (even pairwise majority voting and 
propositionwise majority voting fall into this category). However, going far in 
relaxing the collective rationality conditions may have the undesirable consequence of 
the occurrence of collective outcomes that are outright inconsistent, such as the 
cyclical collective preferences of Condorcet's paradox or the inconsistent collective 
set of judgments of the 'doctrinal paradox' or 'discursive dilemma'.  
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The question thus arises whether the collective rationality conditions can be relaxed 
only slightly, so as to preserve a certain minimal form of collective rationality. There 
are two strategies which have precisely this property. In the framework of 
preferences, the requirement that collective preference orderings be transitive can be 
replaced with the less demanding requirement that they be quasi-transitive -- only the 
strong ordering P, but not the weak ordering R must be transitive --, and the criterion 
of Pareto-dominance can then be used to define an aggregation procedure that 
satisfies all the other conditions of Arrow's theorem. Specifically, an alternative x 
Pareto-dominates an alternative y if all individuals in N unanimously prefer x to y. 
Now x will be collectively at least as good as y if y does not Pareto-dominate x; and x 
will be collectively better than y if x Pareto-dominates y. The analogous escape-route 
in the framework of sets of judgments involves the relaxation of the requirement that 
collective sets of judgments be complete. Then the criterion of unanimity can be used 
to define an aggregation procedure that satisfies all the other conditions of the 
theorem on the aggregation of sets of judgments. Specifically, a proposition will be 
collectively accepted if it is unanimously accepted by all individuals in N.  
 
Both unanimity strategies are attractive in those cases in which unanimous support for 
the resulting collective outcomes is considered important, and where the collectivity 
can afford to withhold judgment whenever no unanimous support can be crafted. 
 
7. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Systematicity: The Conditions 
Driving the Paradoxes? 
 
Independence of irrelevant alternatives requires that the collective ranking of any pair 
of alternatives should depend exclusively on the individual rankings over that pair. 
Systematicity requires that (i) the collective judgment on each proposition should 
depend exclusively on the pattern of individual judgments on that proposition and (ii) 
the same pattern of dependence should hold for all propositions.  
 
As we have seen, in the context of ranking judgments, systematicity entails the 
requirement that (i) each collective pairwise ranking judgment should depend 
exclusively on the pattern of individual ranking judgments over the same pair of 
alternatives and (ii) the same pattern of dependence should hold for all pairwise 
ranking judgments. Part (i) of that requirement is equivalent to independence of 
irrelevant alternatives. Thus systematicity is more demanding than independence of 
irrelevant alternatives.  
 
But both conditions have requirement (i) in common, namely the requirement that a 
collective judgment on a proposition (a pairwise ranking proposition in the case of 
preferences) should depend  exclusively on the pattern of individual judgments on that 
proposition. Drawing on an observation made by Saari (1998) in the case of 
preferences, we will now see that, if the condition of anonymity is also invoked, 
requirement (i) has a striking implication, which might even be seen as a driving force 
behind the two paradoxes and impossibility problems.  
 
According to requirement (i), the collective judgment on a proposition (including a 
pairwise ranking proposition) must depend exclusively on the individual 
acceptance/rejection pattern on that proposition. Further, according to anonymity, that 
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collective judgment must be invariant under permutations of the individuals. The 
conjunction of requirement (i) and anonymity therefore entails that  
 
(*) The collective judgment on a proposition must depend exclusively on the number 
of individuals accepting that proposition, and the number of individuals rejecting it.  
 
To explore the implications of condition (*), we will consider two examples. First, 
consider the profile of personal preference orderings that gives rise to Condorcet's 
paradox: 
 
 xRy yRz xRz yRx zRy zRx 
1 
 
yes yes yes no no no 
2 
 
no yes no yes no yes 
3 
 
yes no no no yes yes 
number of 
yes :  
number of 
no 
2:1 2:1 1:2 1:2 1:2 2:1 
Table 3 
 
Of course, each individual's personal preference ordering is reflexive, transitive and 
connected. The paradox is that pairwise majority voting over these reflexive, 
transitive and connected individual preferences leads to cyclical collective 
preferences. 
 
But, given condition (*), all that matters from the perspective of the aggregation 
procedure is that there are precisely 2 individuals ranking x above y, precisely 2 
individuals ranking y above z, and precisely 2 individuals ranking z above x. These 
total numbers can be brought about not only by the famous profile of Condorcet's 
paradox, but also by the following alternative profile: 
 
 xRy yRz xRz yRx zRy zRx 
1 
 
yes yes no no no yes 
2 
 
yes yes no no no yes 
3 
 
no no yes yes yes no 
number of 
yes :  
number of 
no 
2 : 1 2 : 1 1 : 2 1 : 2 1 : 2 2 : 1 
Table 4 
 
Note that the personal preference orderings of all three individuals are intransitive as 
well as outright cyclical. In short, no individual satisfies the rationality conditions of 
Arrow's theorem. Again, pairwise majority voting leads to cyclical collective 
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preferences, but this time this result seems less paradoxical, in so far as the individual 
preference orderings are cyclical themselves. 
 
Strikingly, though, the profile in table 3 and the one in table 4 have the same 
informational content from the perspective of any aggregation procedure satisfying 
condition (*). This condition forces the aggregation procedure to ignore all the 
information contained in each table except the row labelled "number of yes : number 
of no". The two tables are identical with respect to that row. In particular, the 
aggregation procedure is of necessity insensitive to the crucial information of whether 
or not individual preferences satisfy reflexivity, transitivity and connectedness.  
 
Second, consider the profile of personal sets of judgments that gives rise to the 
doctrinal paradox or discursive dilemma: 
 
 valid contract 
P 
breach 
Q 
legal doctrine 
(R↔(P∧Q)) 
defendant liable 
R 
1 yes yes yes yes 
2 yes no yes no 
3 no yes yes no 
number of yes : 
number of no 
2 : 1 2 : 1 3 : 0 1 : 2 
Table 5 
 
Here, each individual's personal set of judgments is complete, consistent and 
deductively closed. The paradox is that propositionwise majority voting over these 
complete, consistent and deductively closed personal sets of judgments leads to a 
collective set of judgments that violates these consistency conditions. 
 
But, again, given condition (*), all that matters from the perspective of the 
aggregation procedure is that there are precisely 2 individuals accepting P, precisely 2 
individuals accepting Q, precisely 3 individuals accepting (R↔(P∧Q)), and precisely 
2 individuals rejecting R. These total numbers can be brought about not only by the 
profile of the doctrinal paradox or discursive dilemma, but also by an alternative 
profile: 
 
 valid contract 
P 
breach 
Q 
legal doctrine 
(R↔(P∧Q)) 
defendant liable 
R 
1 yes yes yes no 
2 yes yes yes no 
3 no no yes yes 
number of yes : 
number of no 
2 : 1 2 : 1 3 : 0 1 : 2 
Table 6 
 
Note that the personal sets of judgments of all three individuals violate the 
consistency conditions of completeness, consistency and deductive closure. Again, 
propositionwise majority voting leads to an inconsistent collective set of judgments, 
once again an intuitively less surprising result, given that the individual sets of 
judgments are themselves inconsisent. 
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But, here too, the profile in table 5 and the one in table 6 have the same informational 
content from the perspective of any aggregation procedure satisfying condition (*). As 
before, this condition forces the aggregation procedure to ignore all the information 
contained in each table except the row labelled "number of yes : number of no". 
Again, the two tables are identical with respect to that row. Here the aggregation 
procedure is insensitive to the crucial information of whether or not the individual sets 
of judgments satisfy completeness, consistency and deductive closure.  
 
Both examples illustrate that two profiles can be informationally identical from the 
perspective of an aggregation procedure satisfying condition (*), even though the 
individual preferences or sets of judgments in one profile satisfy the relevant 
rationality conditions, while the ones in the other violate them. Intuitively, an 
irrational collective outcome seems a lot less paradoxical when the input to the 
aggregation was itself irrational. The surprising situation is that, of two profiles that 
are informationally identical from the perspective of an aggregation procedure 
satisfying condition (*), only one strikes us as leading to a paradox, while the other 
does not, even though both profiles generate an identical collective outcome.  
 
There are two different interpretations of this finding. On one interpretation, there is 
nothing wrong with imposing independence of irrelevant alternatives or systematicity, 
jointly with anonymity as minimal conditions on aggregation. On this interpretation, 
the heart of the paradoxes lies simply in the fact that, from the perspective of an 
aggregation procedure satisfying these minimal conditions (and by implication 
satisfying condition (*)), a profile of individual inputs satisfying certain rationality 
conditions can be informationally identical to a profile violating these rationality 
conditions.  
 
On the other interpretation, it is considered a bad idea to use an aggregation procedure 
satisfying condition (*) with the aim of generating rational collective outcomes. On 
this interpretation, it is unsurprising, and even expected, that an aggregation procedure 
which ignores any information about the rationality of its input cannot ensure the 
rationality of its output.  
 
On both interpretations, condition (*) appears as a driving force behind the paradoxes 
of aggregation, both Condorcet's paradox and the 'doctrinal paradox' or 'discursive 
dilemma'. On the first interpretation, condition (*) explains why the paradoxes occur, 
and why they are paradoxical. On the second interpretation, condition (*) explains 
why the paradoxes are unsurprising, given independence of irrelevant alternatives or 
systematicity, and why invoking these conditions is a bad idea. In the framework of 
preferences, Saari (1998) rejects the plausibility of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives, or of any minimal condition that implies condition (*). Saari's argument 
is that any aggregation procedure whose informational perspective places rational and 
irrational individual input indistinguishably into the same equivalence class will of 
necessity fail to ensure the rationality of its output; and further that as soon as the 
informational perspective of an aggregation procedure allows distinguishing between 
rational and irrational inputs then it may avoid the paradoxes. 
 
Whichever of the two interpretations we adopt, condition (*) can be seen as a unifying 
mechanism underlying the two at first sight distinct paradoxes. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper has been to compare two impossibility theorems, Arrow's 
theorem on the aggregation of preferences, and a new theorem on the aggregation of 
sets of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions. We began this paper 
with a possibility result, May's theorem on majority voting over two options, and with 
the observation that May's positive result breaks down as soon as a collective decision 
problem deviates from the framework of a single binary choice along one of two 
dimensions: (a) the number of alternatives, and (b) the number of interconnected 
propositions on which simultaneous decisions are to be made. Deviations along 
dimension (a) give rise to Condorcet's paradox and Arrow's theorem, and deviations 
along dimension (b) give rise to the 'doctrinal paradox' or 'discursive dilemma' and the 
new theorem on the aggregation of sets of judgments.  
 
Although the two impossibility theorems are not corollaries of each other, we have 
seen that they are not completely orthogonal either. While the framework of sets of 
judgments cannot be easily mapped into the framework of preferences, the converse 
mapping is possible, and plausible, and we have reinterpreted Condorcet's paradox as 
a result about the aggregation of ranking judgments. We have further derived a new 
simple impossibility theorem on the aggregation of ranking judgments from the more 
general theorem on the aggregation of sets of judgments, and we have compared this 
result with Arrow's theorem.  
 
We have identified escape-routes from Arrow's theorem and the theorem on the 
aggregation of sets of judgments, and have shown not only that the two results have 
similar escape-routes, but also that they are, at least in part, driven by a unifying 
mechanism, namely the informational limitations which the conditions of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives and systematicity place upon the input to the 
aggregation. The identification not only of possible escape-routes but also of 
informational limitations resulting from the minimal conditions of the theorems 
should encourage us to exercise care in interpreting the two impossibility theorems. In 
particular, the theorems should be interpreted not as proofs of the impossibility of 
democratic aggregation, but rather as guidance in approaching the question of when 
collective decisions can be successfully reached, and what the scopes and limits of 
mechanical aggregration are. 
 
Appendix: A Simple Impossibility Theorem on the Aggregation of Ranking 
Judgments 
Christian List 
 
Let N be a set of individuals, and X a set of alternatives, where |N| ≥ 2 and |X| ≥ 3. To 
each i∈N, there corresponds a strong personal preference ordering, Pi, over X, where 
Pi is irreflexive, transitive and complete. A profile of strong personal preference 
orderings is an n-tuple {Pi}n∈N = {P1, P2, ..., Pn}. A ranking judgment aggregation 
function is a function, F, whose input is a profile of strong personal preference 
orderings and whose output is a strong collective preference ordering, P. 
 
Let F be a ranking judgment aggregation function, {Pi}n∈N a profile of strong personal 
preference orderings, and P = F({Pi}n∈N).  
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UNIVERSAL DOMAIN (U). The domain of F is the set of all logically possible profiles 
of irreflexive, transitive and complete strong personal preference orderings. 
 
ANONYMITY (A). For any {Pi}i∈N in the domain of F and any permutation σ : N → N, 
F({Pi}i∈N) = F({Pσ(i)}i∈N). 
 
INDEPENDENCE OF NON-WELFARE CHARACTERISTICS (INW). Suppose {Pi}i∈N and 
{P*i}i∈N are two profiles of personal preference orderings in the domain of F and x1, 
y1 (x1≠y1) and x2, y2 (x2≠y2) are two pairs of alternatives in X such that, for all 
individuals i in N, x1Piy1 if and only if x2P*iy2. Then x1Py1 if and only if x2P*y2. 
 
Theorem 3. There exists no ranking judgment aggregation function F (generating 
irreflexive, transitive and complete strong collective preference orderings) which 
satisfies (U), (A) and (INW).  
 
Proof. Suppose F is a ranking judgment aggregation function satisfying (U), (A) and 
(INW) and generates irreflexive, transitive and complete strong collective preference 
orderings. By assumption, we may assume that x, y, z∈X. 
 
Step (1). For each x, y∈X, define NxPy := {i∈N : xPiy}. Since F satisfies (INW), we 
have, for any two pairs of alternatives x1, y1 (x1≠y1) and x2, y2 (x2≠y2) in X, if Nx1Py1 = 
Nx2Py2, then x1Py1 if and only if x2P*y2. Further, since F satisfies (A) in addition to 
(INW), for any two pairs of alternatives x1, y1 (x1≠y1) and x2, y2 (x2≠y2) in X, if |Nx1Py1| 
= |Nx2Py2|, then x1Py1 if and only if x2P*y2. 
 
Step (2). By assumption, n≥2. Consider a profile of strong personal preference 
orderings with the following properties:  
 
 xPiy yPiz xPiz 
 
zPix 
 
i = 1 (x>y>z)  yes yes yes no 
i = 2 (z>x>y) yes no no yes 
i = 3 (y>z>x) no yes no yes 
i > 3 and i is 
even (x>y>z) 
yes yes yes no 
i > 3 and i is  
odd (z>y>x) 
no no no yes 
Table 7 
 
Let P = F({Pi}i∈N). 
 
First note that, if, for two distinct alternatives x and y in X, xPy and yPx, then this 
entails a contradiction; for, if we have xPy and yPx, then by transitivity we also have 
xPx, which contradicts the assumption that P is irreflexive. 
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Case (i). n is even. We have |NxPz| = |NzPx|, whence xPz if and only if zPx. By the 
completeness of P, at least one of xPz or zPx must hold. But then we must have both 
xPz and zPx, a contradiction. 
 
Case (ii). n is odd. We have |NxPy| = |NyPz| = |NzPx|, whence either all, or none, of xPy, 
yPz and zPx must hold.  
 
If xPy, yPz and zPx, then, since xPy and yPz and P is transitive, xPz. But then both 
zPx and xPz hold, a contradiction.  
 
If not xPy, not yPz and not zPx, then, by the completeness of P, we must have yPx, 
zPy and xPz. But since zPy and yPx and P is transitive, zPx. But then, once again, both 
zPx and xPz hold, a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
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Akeel Bilgrami, Steven Brams, Geoffrey Brennan, John Collins, John Dryzek, Mark 
Fey, Robert Goodin, James Johnson, Marek Kaminski, Isaac Levi, Carol Rovane, 
Teddy Seidenfeld and Michael Wagner. Addresses for correspondence: Christian List, 
Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1NF, U.K., E-mail 
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christian.list@nuffield.oxford.ac.uk; Philip Pettit, RSSS, Australian National 
University, Canberra ACT 0200, Australia, E-mail pnp@coombs.anu.edu.au. 
2 Another, less plausible possibility is this. Each proposition-negation pair constitutes 
a separate set of alternatives, and each individual has a separate preference ordering 
for each such set of alternatives. For each proposition-negation pair, the 
corresponding ordering would rank a proposition above its negation if the individual 
accepts the proposition, and the negation above the proposition if the individual 
rejects the proposition. This approach is not particularly promising as a way of 
mapping the aggregation problem addressed by the new impossibility theorem into 
the aggregation problem addressed by Arrow's theorem. Under the present approach, 
a single problem of simultaneous aggregation over multiple interconnected 
propositions would simply be decomposed into several separate preference 
aggregation problems, one corresponding to each proposition-negation pair. The 
approach would be silent on how the logical interconnections between the preferences 
on different such proposition-negation pairs could be captured. A further problem 
regarding the identification of a separate preference ordering for each proposition-
negation pair is that an individual's preferences on different proposition-negation pairs 
may not be separable from each other. Supposing that P is collectively accepted, the 
question of whether an individual prefers (P∧Q) to ¬(P∧Q) may still depend on 
whether or not Q is also collectively accepted. An individual may place a particular 
value on consistency that may reverse his or her preference ordering on certain 
proposition-negation pairs, depending on the judgments collectively reached on other 
proposition-negation pairs. In short, the present approach fails to reduce the problem 
of simultaneous aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions to a single 
aggregation problem over multiple alternatives. 
3 The symmetrical distance of one set of judgments from another is simply the total 
number of proposition-negation pairs on which the two sets fail to coincide. For 
example, the symmetrical distance between {P, Q, R, (P∧Q)} and {P, ¬Q, R, 
¬(P∧Q)} is 2. 
4 Ostrogorski's paradox can be seen as a result about the aggregation of preferences 
over sets of multiple propositions. Specifically, Ostrogorski's paradox shows that 
proposition-by-proposition aggregation and aggregation of preferences over entire 
sets of propositions can lead to different outcomes, with the former method leading to 
collective sets of propositions that are dispreferred according to the latter method. See 
Anscombe (1976) and Kelly (1989). 
5 While pairwise ranking propositions like xRy, yRz etc. might seem representable as 
atomic propositions, the propositions stating reflexivity, transitivity and 
connectedness all contain quantifiers and cannot easily be represented as quantifier-
free propositions of the propositional calculus. However, given a finite set of 
alternatives X, all logically possible pairwise ranking propositions can be exhaustively 
enumerated, and all substitution instances of the reflexivity, transitivity and 
connectedness can also be exhaustively enumerated. This would provide a way of 
representing all the ranking propositions from the framework of Arrow's theorem as 
propositions of the propositional calculus. Unlike a predicate calculus representation 
of ranking propositions, this representation does not explicitly display the internal 
structure of these ranking propositions, and does not explicitly mark compound 
propositions as being instances of reflexivity, transitivity or connectedness. 
 
